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NOT GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION: WHY THE
TAINT OF THEIR "BLANK CHECK"
PREDECESSORS SHOULD NOT STUNT
THE GROWTH OF MODERN SPECIAL
PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES
Abstract: During the 1980s, "blank check" companies were prominent
vehicles for fraud and abuse in the penny stock market. These companies
largely disappeared as a result of regulatory backlash in the 1990s, but a
new type of company with a similar structure has taken their place in the
securities market: the Special Purpose Acquisition Company ("SPAC").
Much like their blank check predecessors, SPACs have no operations;
they merely issue securities with the intent of using the proceeds for
merging with or acquiring another company. Although SPACs have en-
joyed increased prominence in the market, regulators continue to view
them with considerable skepticism. In addition to promulgating regula-
tions forcing SPACs to disclose more information to potential investors,
the Securities and Exchange Commission deliberately moves slowly in
processing SPAC deals, with the hope of curbing the pace of SPAC offer-
ings. This Note argues that continuing to treat SPACs similarly to the
blank check companies of the 1980s is a misguided strategy because the
characteristics of the two, once one looks beyond their basic structure,
differ significantly. This Note also emphasizes that SPACs may be the only
method of raising capital for smaller emerging companies. It thus con-
chides that any efforts to thwart the SPAC structure itself reflect an erro-
neous attempt to protect investors, at the expense of allowing this latest
Wall Street innovation to facilitate capital formation.
INTRODUCTION
On February 21, 2008, the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. ("Nasdaq")
announced that it was proposing a change to Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") rules governing the listing of Special Purpose Ac-
quisition Companies ("SPACs"). 1 Two weeks later, on March 6, the New
I Press Release, Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., NASDAQ Proposes Listing Standards for
Acquisition Vehicles: Move Will Enhance Protection and Transparency in This Active Mar-
ket Segment (Feb. 21, 2008), available at http://itnasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?Release
ID=295473. A SPAC, often referred to as a "blank check company," is a public shell com-
pany with no operating assets and no business plan. David Smith et al., Reverse Mergers and
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York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") followed suit by applying to the SEC to
change its rules for SPAC listings as well. 2 These announcements, cou-
pled with the recent filing by Goldman Sachs for its first SPAC initial
public offering ("IPO"), were perhaps the most striking endorsements
of the potential for the modern-day SPAC, the arrival of which has re-
ceived mixed reviews. 3 Historically, SPACs only were allowed to trade on
the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board ("OTC-BB"). 4 In 2005, however,
much to the consternation of the SEC, the American Stock Exchange
("Amex") surprised the industry by beginning to list SPACs. 5
SPACs have been tainted in the minds of regulators because they
evoke images of the "blank check" companies of the 1980s that thrived
amidst a penny stocks market dominated by fraudulent and manipulat-
Nanotechnology, 4 NANOTECI1NOLOGY L. & Bus. 87, 91 (2007). A SPAC's stated purpose
when conducting an initial public offering ("IPO") is to accumulate capital in order to
identify and then acquire or merge with a suitable private operating company. Id. Nasdaq's
current rules only allow SPACs to list after they have completed an acquisition and become
operating companies. See Helen Avery, SPACs Take Aim for UK Presence, EUROMONEY, June
2006, at 46, 82-87.
2 Lynn Cowan, NYSE to 'Welcome "Blank-Check Companies," WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008, at
CI Generally, N1SE's IPO rules require companies to have a financial history spanning at
least three years before they may list on the exchange. Id. Bemuse SPACs do not have an
operating history or money on their balance sheets prior to going public, they cannot
meet that standard. Id. NYSE Euronext has proposed an exception to these rules that will
allow SPACs to list. Id.
' See Ridgeway Barker & Rantfi-Jean Hedin, SPACs—Continuing to Grow and Evolve,
NiETROPOIXIAN CORP. COUNS., June 2007, at 38; Lynn Cowan, Goldman Writes Out "Blank
Check," WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2008, at C3; Jennifer Reingold, The IPO Gets Edgy, FORTUNE,
Feb. 19, 2007, at 17; Press Release, Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., supra note 1.
4 Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, §§ 501-510, 104 Stat. 931,
951-58 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at
8 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1408, 1410-11.
5 Sec Steven Boehm et al., A Primer on SPACs: An Explanation of the Purpose, Structure and
Current Issues Affecting Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, MONDAQ, Aug. 11, 2005, http://
wwwniondaq.co.uk/article.asp?articleid  =34272&latestnews= 1.
6 Section 503(a) of the Penny Stock Reform Act amended Section 3(a) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 by adding a definition for a "penny stock." Penny Stock Reform
Act § 503. The statute thus defines a "penny stock" as:
[A] ly equity security other than a security that is-
(i) registered or approved for registration and traded on a national securities
exchange that meets such criteria as the [SEC] shall prescribe by rule or
regulation ...
(ii) authorized for quotation on an automated quotation system sponsored by
a registered securities association ... ;
(iii) issued by an investment company registered under the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940;
(iv) excluded on the basis of exceeding a minimum price, net tangible assets
of the issuer, or other relevant criteria, front the definition of such term by
rule or regulation which the [SEC] shall prescribe ... ; or
20091	 Why the SEC Should Promote Special Purpose Acquisition Companies 	 239
ive trading practices.? As a result of "pump and dump" schemes, inves-
tors, during one period, lost an estimated $2 billion per year on penny
stocks.8 Perpetrators of penny stock fraud orchestrated their schemes
through the marketing of public shell corporations, often referred to as
"blank check" companies" These "blank checks" had no operating his-
tory, few employees, few or no discernible assets, and often no legiti-
mate likelihood of future success. 11) Because their only stated purpose
was to merge with an unidentified private operating company, investors
had little material information on which to evaluate an investment in
such a company."
In the ensuing decade, Congress and the SEC responded to the
widespread fraud in the penny stock market by passing laws and prom-
ulgating regulations requiring enhanced disclosure about blank check
companies, reducing the recidivist criminal elements in the penny
stock market, and providing specific protections for investors in blank
check schemes, 12 As a result of this regulatory backlash, the blank
check company largely disappeared from the market during the late
1990s.' 3
In the wake of the bursting of the dot-corn bubble, however, blank
check companies reemerged under the title of the Special Purpose Ac-
quisition Company." SPACs present an attractive opportunity for many
(v) exempted, in whole or in part, conditionally or unconditionally, from the
definition of such term by rule, regulation, or order prescribed by the SEC.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (51) (A) (2006).
7 See Penny Stock Reform Act § 502; H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-13; Gregory A.
Robb, Fraud Cited in Penny Stocks, N.Y. Timm, Sept, 7, 1989, at 05.
8 Robb, supra note 7. Brokers controlling large blocks of thinly traded securities ma-
nipulated the share price of those securities by trading shares back and forth between
nominee accounts and touting the investments' limitless potential to customers (the
"pump"). Randolph Beatty & Padma Kadiyala, Impact of the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 on
the Initial Public Offering Market, 46 J.L. & ECON. 517, 517 (2003); Thomas L. James, Use of
Reverse Meigv,s to Bypass IPOs: A New Trend for Nanotech Companies, 4 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. &
Bus. 95, 97 (2007). Brokers would then sell their large block at an artificially inflated price,
resulting in a financial windfall to the brokers and a plummeting share price for investors
(the "dump"). Beatty & Kadiyala, supra, at 517; James, supra, at 96.
joris M. Hogan, Corporate Governance Update: Real Time Disclosure Becomes a Reality and
the SEC Nixes Shell Company Schemes, 32 SEC. REG, U. 1, 13 (2004); see also H.R. REP. No.
101-617, at 10-13.
'° Hogan, supra note 9, at 13; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-13.
11
 Hogan, supra note 9, at 13; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-13.
12 See Penny Stock Reform Act §§ 501-510; H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 7-10, 20-23.
18 See Boehm et al., supra note 5.
Id.: Noah Klaris, Planting Pearls in Shells: Evaluating the Possibilities of a Reverse Merger,
Bus. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb, 2003, at 41, 44.
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private companies seeking to reap the benefits of "going public," 15
while avoiding the costs inherent in the IPO process. 16
 Rather than face
the prospect of selling itself to a new investing public, a private com-
pany can engage in a reverse merger with a SPAC, thereby accessing an
already-established investor base in addition to the advantages of the
capital markets, 17
 Aside from the costs of an IPO, SPACs may present
the only opportunity for emerging companies to "go public" because
investment banks typically favor larger private companies with high
revenues and strong operating histories. 18 With leveraged buyouts
15 Smith et al., supra note 1; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
Stockholders of a public company have instant liquidity because they can sell their shares
on the open market. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Truth About Reverse Mergm, 2 ENTRE-
PRENEURIAL Bus. 14, 753, 758 (2008). This liquidity may increase the value of the shares
themselves. See id. Moreover, shares of stock in a public company may be used as currency
to fund strategic acquisitions or collaborative partnering with other companies. See it
In addition to the advantages of liquidity, public companies and their management
are generally held in higher esteem by prospective investors, customers, and suppliers.
Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88-91; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
This prestige, in turn, enables public companies to attract top-notch management person-
nel. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88-91; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41; Boehm et al., supra
note 5. A public company is also better suited to attract and retain such personnel by offer-
ing attractive stock-based compensation plans because these shares can be sold on the
open market. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88-91; Klaris, supra note 19, at 41; Boehm et al.,
supra note 5.
Going public also provides a company with greater flexibility in its financing. Smith et
al., supra note 1, at 88-91; Klaris, 11111172 note 14, at 91; Boehm et al., supra note 5. It provides
access to the public markets through stock or debt offerings. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88-
91; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41; Boehm et al., supra note 5. It also enables the company to
undergo alternative financing such as a private investment in public equity ("PIPE") transac-
tion. Finally, public companies generally have greater access to bank financing on more fa-
vorable terms. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88-91; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41; Boehm et al.,
supra note 5.
16 Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 49.
r7 Sjostrom, supra note 15, at 758. In a typical reverse merger, a private operating com-
pany works with a "shell promoter" to locate suitable non-operating or public shell com-
panies. Smith et al., supra note 1; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44. The private company then
either merges with the shell or a newly formed subsidiary of the shell company (a ''reverse
triangular merger"). Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 49.
Post-merger, the shell company contains the assets and liabilities of the operating
company and is controlled by the former operating company shareholders. Smith et al.,
supra note 1, at 88; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44. The shell company's name is then
changed to the name of the operating company, and its shares continue to trade on the
stock market that they were trading on before the merger. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88;
Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44. The operating company's business is generally still , con-
trolled by the same group of shareholders and managed by the same directors and offi-
cers. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44. Essentially, the private
operating company succeeds to the shell's public status. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88;
Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44.
IS Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88; Klaris, supra note 14, at .41, 44.
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("LBOs") lagging in large part due to the subprime mortgage crisis and
resulting credit crunch, SPAC deals have picked up the slack. 19 These
transactions are lightly leveraged, enabling private companies to garner
large cash infusions in equity rather than debt. 2°
Despite this ever-increasing growth and acceptance on the mar-
ket, however, the SEC's ongoing distaste for SPACs "is no secret."21 In
2005, the SEC passed several new regulations geared toward mandat-
ing enhanced disclosure from public shell companies. 22 By requiring
private operating companies merging with public shells to provide the
same level of disclosure required in a traditional IPO, the new rules
effectively removed some of the incentive for "going public" through
a SPAC. 23 In addition to such formal regulations, the SEC has contin-
ued to review SPAC registration statements and proxy materials with
greater scrutiny. 24 Many bankers and lawyers have suggested that the
SEC is deliberately spending considerable time vetting deals, hoping
to slow down the pace of SPAC offerings. 25
This Note analyzes current formal and informal regulatory prac-
tices with regard to the formation of SPACs, as well as their use as a ve-
hicle by private companies seeking to "go public." 26 Part I of this Note
discusses the history of congressional and SEC regulation of public
'9 Elizabeth Hester, Wall Street Peddles Blank-Check IPOs as Returns Trail S&P 500,
BLOOMBERG.COM , Jan. 6, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid
=aLgaESfbEylis&refer= home; Richard Pinto, Stocked Market: US Lawyers Still Have Enough to
Survive, IFIRt.v,cArwIRE. Apr. 28, 2008, http://wwwiflrlegalwire.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID
=1922683&LS=EMS177315. The term "leverage" refers to the use of debt to acquire assets.
Lartease Tiffith, Hedge Fund Regulation: What the FSA Is Doing Right and Why the SEC Should
Follow the FSA's Lead, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & 13us. 497, 509-14 (2007). This enables different
investment vehicles to invest significantly larger sums of money than their total amount of
capital. Id.
20 See Tiffith, supra note 19, at 509-14.
21 Barker & Hedin, supra note 3, at 38; see also Reingold, supra note 3, at 17 (identifying
the enhanced scrutiny that the SEC applies in its review of SPAC offerings and proxy mate-
rials for SPAC transactions).
22 Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234
( July 21, 2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.419; 239.16b; 240.12b-2; 249.308 (2008)).
23 See id.
24 Paul Braude, Should I'm Sell to a SPAC?, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: THE DEAL-
MAKER'S J., May 1, 2007, at 76-79.
25 Barker & Hedin, supra note 3, at 38; Reingold, supra note 3, at 17. The SEC has con-
siderable discretion during this review process. See William B. Barker, SEC Registration of
Public Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, Bus. L. TODAY, at 65, 73 (1996). One example
of such discretion occurs at the outset of the process, when the staff "screens" registration
statements to determine the appropriate level of review: deferred review, monitor, no re-
view, or full review. Id.
26 See infra notes 210-323 and accompanying text.
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shell companies. 27 It also summarizes the more recent wave of public
shell company regulation. 28 Part II discusses the use of SPACs as vehi-
cles through which private companies may "go public" without under-
going the increasingly burdensome IPO process. 29 It details the various
restrictions that SPACs have imposed on themselves in order to en-
hance investor protection, as well as the natural evolution of SPACs. 3°
Finally, Part Ill argues that the concerns underlying the regulation
of public shell companies in the late 1980s are not present with
SPACs. 31 It argues further that increased regulation of SPACs, as well as
the SEC's alleged use of the review process to thwart SPAC transactions,
is thus misguided for numerous reasons. 52 First, the SEC's disclosure
requirements for public shell companies, as well as SPACs' self-imposed
restrictive measures, provide sufficient protection for investors. 33 Sec-
ond, the rapidly increasing growth of SPACs, as well as the participation
of high-end investment banks acting as underwriters both undercut the
notion that SPACs will devolve into the fraud-prone blank checks of the
1980s.34 Finally, increased competition among different SPACs, private
equity funds, and hedge funds for high-profile private companies will
lead to higher-quality SPAC managers and perhaps even more self-
imposed measures ensuring investor quality. 33
Moving beyond any potential dangers to investors, SPACs provide a
vehicle for "going public," enabling potentially revolutionary emerging
companies that might not be suitable IPO candidates to access the capi-
tal markets. 56 Enabling such companies to attain rapid growth could, in
turn, stimulate job growth and support the overall strength of the mar-
ket.37 The current level of regulatory scrutiny has led several SPACs to
leave the United States for the greener pastures of foreign markets, po-
tentially diminishing the positive effects that they could have on the
American economy." For all of these reasons, this Note argues that the
27 See infra notes 42-126 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 118-126 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 127-209 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 131-154 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 210-323 and accompanying text.
]2 See infra notes 210-323 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 215-232 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 233-298 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 299-323 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 299-323 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 299-323 and accompanying text.
" See Avery, supra note 1, at 82-87 (explaining that more SPAC listings are on the way
as the industry becomes frustrated with the regulations put in place by the SEC and legis-
lation like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); see also Nicholas Pettifer, European SPACs Don't Need
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SEC should be working to facilitate the growth of the SPAC structure. 39
Such a regulatory approach would not represent an abandonment of
its traditional duty to protect investors from unscrupulous brokers."
Rather, by working with exchanges such as Nasdaq and NYSE to help
promote the growth of this investment vehicle, the SEC can fulfill its
three-part mission: to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly and effi-
cient markets; and facilitate capital formation:II
1. REGULATION OF PUBLIC SHELL COMPANIES
According to former SEC Chairman David Ruder, during the
1980s, penny stock fraud was "one of the most menacing problems fac-
ing investors, regulators, and the legitimate securities industry. 9'42 The
North American Securities AdministratorS Association ("NASAA") had
likewise concluded that penny stock swindles were the chief threat of
fraud and abuse facing small investors." Increased regulation of public
shell companies was thus initiated with the hope of curbing these wide-
spread manipulative and fraudulent trading practices." This Part de-
scribes the fraudulent practices dominating the penny stock market in
the 1980s." Then it summarizes the efforts of Congress and the SEC to
protect investors from these predatory market practices." Finally, it de-
scribes the recent SEC rulemaking that mandates enhanced disclosure
for public shell companies.47
Formal Regulation. IFLRLEGAmtim, Apr. 22, 2008, http://www.iflr.com/Article/1982935/
European-Spacs-don39t-need-formal-regulation.html (highlighting a viewpoint in Europe
that SPACs "are so transparent that market forces will be enough to regulate them").
39 See infra notes 299-323 and accompanying text.
4° See infra notes 299-323 and accompanying text.
41 See Encouraging Small Busineis Growth and Access to Capital: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 108th Cong. 3-16 (2004) [here-
inafter Encouraging Small Business] (statement of Alan Beller, Director, Division of Corporate
Finance, SEC), available at http://www.sec.govinews/testimony/ts092304alb.htm.
42 1-1.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 7 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1408, 1409.
43 Id.; Robb, supra note 7.
44 See John M. Doyle, SEC Proposal Aims at Penny Stock Fraud, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 12,
1991, at B3; Diana B. Henriques, Wall Street: Cleaning Up Penny-Stock Fraud, N.Y. Timm, Apr.
15. 1990, at F15; Penny Stock Rules Asked, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12. 1991, at D5; Gregory A. Robb,
House Panel Approves Measure on Penny Stocks, N.Y TIMES, June 21, 1990, at D20.
45 See infra notes 53-97 and accompanying text.
4° See infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 128-139 and accompanying text
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A. The 1980s: Fraud Dominates the Penny Stock Matitet
Until 1983, the penny stock industry was primarily regional in na-
ture.48 The majority of penny stock brokerages were headquartered in
Denver, Colorado; Salt Lake City, Utah; and Spokane, Washington. 49
Although thousands of investors had already lost millions of dollars at
the hands of fraudulent penny stock schemes, most regulators regarded
such abuses as a mountain state problem unworthy of national con-
cern. 50
During the 1980s, the nature of the penny stock market funda-
mentally changed as numerous brokerage firms moved away from the
initial public offering of "hot issues" as the forum for market man ipula-
don and toward the secondary markets. 51 The growth of technology; as
well as the ability to purchase phone lists enabled penny stock manipu-
lators to operate globally. 52 In 1988, 12.5 percent of all substantive in-
vestor complaints received by the SEC concerned brokers at penny
stock firms." By 1989, penny stock firms comprised 22 percent of that
total.54 In addition to the rising level of complaints related to penny
stock brokerages, the number of penny stock brokerages increased
from a total of fifty-five, headquartered in six states in 1983, to 325 with
headquarters in twenty-nine states and branch offices throughout the
country only six years later. 55 Moreover, over that same time period, the
estimated costs of penny stock fraud rose to approximately $2 billion
dollar per year. 56
48 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 9; Barbara Arsteinsen, High-Risk "Pennies" far the Bold, N.Y.
Tams, Nov. 17, 1985, at FP24; Nathaniel C. Nash, S.E.C. Upgrades Its Regulation of Penny
Stock Market, N.Y. Twos, Oct. 24, 1988, at D2.
"H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 9; Arsteinsen, supra note 48; Nash, supra note 48.
56 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 9.
51 Id. "I lot issues" are IPOs of small, new companies with "bright and profitable fu-
tures t,l " such as energy and mining concerns, or high tech and health-related innovations.
Id. Although brokerages dealing in penny stocks were beholden to the unpredictable na-
ture of these Mot issues,* it would be difficult to develop large and diverse investor bases
necessary for the creation of a large, national penny stock brokerage firm. Id. The secon-
dary market is the market for a security after the IPO. Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 9; Robb, supra note 7.
56 Doyle, supra note 44; PM ny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44; Robb, supra note 7, A list
of the complaints filed against F.D. Roberts Securities, Inc., provides another illustration of
the pervasiveness of fraud in penny stock brokerages. H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 13-15. In
December 1988, the SEC filed a civil injunctive action against F.D. Roberts alleging that
the firm had engaged in a scheme to manipulate the price of Hughes Capital securities. Id.
A second SEC action was filed in November 1989 against eight individuals for two blind
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These rising numbers put Congress on notice of the problem of
penny stock fraud. 57 Congress identified two characteristics of the
penny stock market that facilitated fraud: (1) an information gap in
which investors were given little useful information on which to base
an investment decision, thus allowing for easy manipulation by a few
insiders; and (2) an extraordinary number of market participants who
were either repeat offenders of state or federal securities laws, con-
victed felons, or persons with ties to organized crime. 58
The architects of penny stock schemes often sold the IPO to a
collection of friendly brokerage firms in order to maintain tight con-
trol of the market. 59 These stocks were generally thinly traded, with
only one, or possibly a few brokers in the stock. 60 This made it easier
to manipulate prices than with typical listed securities with numerous
buyers and sellers and an active market to set the price."
After the IPO, penny stock brokers manipulated the share
price.62 Often, the stock was given to other insiders at a very low price
and then repurchased.63 At this stage, nominee accounts traded the
stock back and forth until the price reached a certain level." Then
the stock was sold to the public at an artificially inflated value, some-
times with undisclosed excessive markups as large as 1000 percent. 65
pool offerings underwritten by F.D. Roberts. Id. In May 1989, the former national sales
manager, branch manager, and two brokers from F.D. Roberts pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to use of fraudulent sales techniques to sell penny stocks and to manipulate the prices of
those stocks. Id. The U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey stated that the fraudulent
activities of these co-conspirators cost the investing public $67 million and that the co-
conspirators made illegal profits of as much as 400 percent by trading in nominee ac-
counts and lining up secondary-market sales before the IPO had even taken place. Id.
An administrative action was also filed in May 1989 to revoke the licenses of thirty-five
former agents of F.D. Roberts for engaging in a particular scheme to manipulate penny
stock. H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 14-15. These agents had allegedly garnered one-day prof-
its exceeding $754,000 by purchasing preferred stock at $1 per share and reselling it later
that day for between $3 and $3.50 per share. Id. Such sales were allegedly effected through
the use of deceptive sales practices and high pressure telephone solicitations. Id.
57 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 14-15.
58 Id.: see also Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked,
supra note 44.
59 Nash, supm note 98.
68 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-12; Nash, supra note 48.
81 Nash, supm note 48; David S. Ruder, Chairman, SEC, Lunch Address at the SEC/
NASAA Section 19(c) Conference (Apr. 26, 1989) (transcript on file with author).
62
 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-12.
Bs Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. These markups were often obtained through the arrangement of "buy and sell"
campaigns. Id. In a '`buy and sell" campaign, one group of investors was encouraged to sell
its shares of a particular stock, while another group was encouraged to buy shares at a
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Many penny stock brokers furthered their manipulative practices
by implementing coercive sales tactics. 66 Penny stock sales were often
conducted out of "boiler room" operations where inexperienced sales
people solicited prospective investors by cold calling them and then
pressuring them into acting quickly so as to not miss out on any poten-
tial prolit.67 In addition to lacking experience and knowledge, these
salespeople would often provide false or misleading information about
a stock's performance, the company itself and its growth prospects, and
the market for the securities. 68 These cold calls generally targeted inex-
perienced investors who did not have the knowledge to make accurate
analyses of the risks involved.°
The most notorious method for committing penny stock fraud,
however, was through the marketing of blank check companies." These
public shells had no operating history, few employees, few or no dis-
cernible assets, and no legitimate likelihood of future success: 11 Be-
cause their only stated business purpose was to engage in some form of
business combination with an unidentified private operating company,
there was little material information included in their registration state-
men ts. 72
Approximately 70 percent of all penny stock issues offered be-
tween the beginning of 1988 through the third quarter of 1989 were
blank check companies. 78 In the typical blank check scheme, most of
higher price. Id. When the investor wished to sell her stock and collect her own profit, the
broker could not conventionally move the stock to another buyer, and the investor was
told there were no buyers at that time. id. Alternatively, the investor might have been co-
erced into using his "profit" to purchase another penny stock recommended by the broker.
Id. Brokers often engaged in other manipulative practices, including refusing to accept sell
orders or to deliver securities to customers. Id.
66 Henriques, supra note 44; Nash. supra note 48; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44;
Leonard Sloane, Many Dangers of Blind Offers, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,1987, at 38.
67 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-12; Sloane, supra note 66; see alto BOILER Room (New
Line Cinema 2001).
66 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-12; Nash, supra note 48.
69 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-12. Penny stock brokerage firms commonly employed
the "three-call approach." Id. In the first call, the broker introduced himself and informed
prospective investors that lie often received "hot" stock tips. Id. The broker would then call
potential investors who appeared interested a second time, to let them know that he would
keep them in mind the next time a "hot" stock became available. Id. With the third call,
the broker would pitch an "irresistible deal." Id.
71) Henriques, supra note 44; Nash, supra note 48; Robb, supm note 44; Sloane, supra
note 66.
71 Henriques, supra note 44; Nash, supra note 48; Robb, supra note 44; Sloane, supm
note 66.
72 H.R. REP. No. 101.617, at 10-12.
7'3 Id. at 19.
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the company's stock was distributed to the underwriting broker and his
business associates and friends. 74 The brokerage would then circulate
false rumors about a possible merger and the profitability of the al-
leged target, thereby triggering increases in stock prices." Insiders
would then call potential investors, depicting the blank check as having
just merged with an emerging growth company with incredible up-
side." The stock prices would then climb precipitously until the insid-
ers decided to sell their shares, causing the price to plummet. 77
Blinder, Robinson & Co., one of the most active players in the
penny stock market of the 1980s, frequently benefited from such blank
check offerings. 78 For example, on January 15, 1985, Meyer Blinder,
Arnold L. Kimmes, and Michael D. Wright entered into an agreement
with Blinder's securities brokerage whereby Kimmes and Wright agreed
to provide substantially all of the securities for its blind pool corpora-
tions upon demand and at pre-fixed prices." Kinn-nes and Wright cre-
ated and secretly controlled several blind pool corporations, using fig-
urehead officers and false registration statements to disguise their
actual control. 8° Blinder, Robinson & Co. subsequently acquired 100
percent of the securities of two blank check corporations, Onnix Fi-
nancial Group, Inc. and Executive Capital, Inc. 81
The firm proceeded to sell these securities to its customers without
disclosing to them that the purported IPO was a sham. 82 It further failed
to provide the purchasers of the blind pool stock with prospectuses. 83
Blinder, Robinson's secret unlimited access to the securities effectively
created a rigged market. 84 This enabled Blinder to profit through risk-
free transactions featuring arbitrarily established prices.85 Blinder, Rob-
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 19.
78 See United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993); Blinder Files far Bank.
ruptcy, N.Y Timm, Aug. 1, 1990, at D5; Florida Moves Against Blinder; Robinson, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 1989, at D17; Investors Sue Penny Broker, N.Y. Timm, May 6, 1989, at 45.
79
 Blinder, 10 F.3d at 1471. Blind pools are arrangements by which companies sell secu-
rities, generally through an IPO, without stating specifically how the proceeds will be used.
Sloane, supra note 66. Blank checks are one version of a blind pool. Id. Instead of identify-
ing their proposed investment, blank checks assert an intention to search for promising
private operating companies. Id.
92 Blinder, 10 F.3d at 1471.
81 Id.
82
 Id.
83
 Id.
84
 Id.
III Blinder, 10 F.3d at 1471.
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inson sold Onnix shares at substantial markups.86 Seeking to further
capitalize on vulnerable investors, it allegedly sold 42,000 nonexistent
shares, generating gross profits of $1,384,000 for its brokers 8 7
11. The Solution? The Penny Stock Reform Act
On July 20, 1990, the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act (the "PSRA" or the "Act") was introduced. 89 The Act
represented Congress's response to the rampant fraud and manipula-
tion of investors incident to participation in the penny stock market. 99
In the PSRA, Congress focused its legislative powers on three primary
issues within the penny stock market: (1) an overall lack of information
about companies and transactions; (2) the participation of repeat
criminals as brokers and dealers; and (3) fraud and manipulation
through blank check offerings. 90 The PSRA, however, did not seek to
ban blank check offerings.9 ' Rather, it sought to equip investors with
the tools to make better choices and to better monitor their investment
opportun i ties. 92
86 H.R. REP. No. 101-617. at 13-14.
87 Id. On July 2, 1992, a jury found Blinder guilty of racketeering conspiracy, racketeer-
ing, securities fraud, and unlawful distribution of securities. Blinder, 10 F.3d ai 1471. He
was sentenced to 46 months incarceration and fined $100,000. Id. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Blinder's motions
for dismissal as well as the denial of motions for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, the
fuse, and cost of incarceration. Id.
On August 1, 1990, Blinder. Robinson & Co., once the largest penny-stack brokerage in
the world, filed for protection from its creditors under Chapter 11 of federal bankruptcy
laws. Blinder Files for Bankruptcy. supra note 44. The company had shrunk to one-third of its
former size during investigations by regulators and investor lawsuits. Id. It suffered losses of
$14.8 million in 1988 and $11.7 million in 1989. Id. It owed its customers $4.8 million and
other brokerage firms $400,000 in cash. Id. Additionally, the filing said Blinder, Robinson
owed its customers and other brokerage firms $70 million in securities. Id.
88 Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-429, §§ 501-510, 104 Stat. 931, 951-58
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 7-10.
89 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 7-10; Beatty & Kadiyala, supra note 8, at 517; James, supra
note 8, at 98; Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra
note 44; Robb, supra note 44; Kelvin G. Salwen, SEC Broadens Disclosure Rules on Small Stocks,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1992. at C14.
" Penny Stock Reform Act §§ 506-510; Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44;
Nash, supra note 48; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44; Robb, supra note 44; Sloane,
supra note 66. .
et Cutting Penny Stock Fraud: SEC Proposes New Rules to Arm Unsuspecting Investors, NEWS-
DAY (New York City), Apr. 12, 1991, at 47; Robb, supra note 44.
92 Cutting Penny Stock Fraud, supra note 91, at 47; Robb, supra note 44. The Act, as
originally proposed by Rep. Edward J. Markey, would have prohibited blank check compa-
nies from registering with the SEC and selling their shares publicly. Henriques, supra note
44. The proposal represented a departure from the notion that adequate, truthful disclo-
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The PSRA added a new paragraph to Section 3(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") that defines "penny stock,"
thereby determining the scope of securities covered by the new legisla-
tion." In defining penny stock, Congress sought to include within the
definition securities trading in the over-the-counter market that were
not registered on an exchange or authorized on the Nasdaq market 9 4
The PSRA also amended Section 15(b) (6) of the Exchange Act
to expand the scope of the SEC's authority to bar individuals from the
securities business. 95 The amendment sought to lessen the role played
in the penny stock market by former violators of federal and state se-
curities laws, convicted felons, and persons with ties to organized
crime. 96 Congress thereby granted the SEC the authority to suspend,
bar, or place limitations on the activities or functions of any person
associated or striving to become associated with a broker or dealer or
to bar such person from even participating in the distribution of
penny stocks." Finally, the amendment prohibited any broker from
participating in distribution of any penny stock without SEC consent,
if the reasonably acting broker was aware of, or should have been
aware of, the participation of a barred person. 98
sure was a sufficient antidote to stock fraud. Id. Rather, the bill envisioned a standard for
registration and trading that suggested that some companies should not be permitted to
sell shares to the public, regardless of how candid their paperwork might be. Id. Both the
SEC and the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), however, balked at
Markey's proposal. Cutting Penny Stock Fraud supra note 91; Henriques, supra note 44;
Robb, supra note 44. The SEC thought that a flat ban of blank-check companies would
have prevented legitimate capital raising by small companies. Cutting Penny Stock Fraud,
supra note 91; Robb, supra note 44. Opposed to such a ban, the SEC sought the power to
require increased disclosure. Robb, supra note 44. Sarah B. Ackerson, Chief of the Com-
mission's Penny Stock Task Force, explained that the SEC's rules promulgated in response
to the PSRA "really open the door for investor information .... They're very consumer
oriented and hopefully will arm investors with the kind of information that they need to
make better choices and to monitor their own investment opportunities." Cutting Penny
Stock Fraud, supra note 91, at 47.
93 Penny Stock Reform Act § 503; H.R. REP, No. 101-617, at 16-19.
94
 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 26.
99 Penny Stock Reform Act § 504; H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 28.
96 Penny Stock Reform Act § 504; Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44;
Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44.
97 Penny Stock Reform Act § 504. Any person subject to such an SEC order barring or
suspending participation in distribution of penny stock was forbidden to associate or seek
to become associated with a broker or dealer, or participate in distribution of penny stock
without the SEC's consent. Id.
98 Id
250	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 50:237
Congress also took direct aim at blank check companies in par-
ticular. 99
 Section 7 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") was
amended to require the SEC to adopt rules restricting blank check
companies from registering within one year of the law's enactment.m
C. SEC Rulemaking in Response to the PSRA
In response to the PSRA, the SEC issued Rule 419, which applies
to every registration statement filed under the Securities Act relating
to blank check offerings.Im The SEC defined a blank check company
as "a company in its development stage, offering penny stock either
(1) where the company has no specific business plan or purpose, or (2)
where the company has indicated that its business purpose is to merge
with an unidentified company (or companies) issuing penny stock." 102
Although Rule 419 only applies to offerings registered under the Secu-
rides Act, blank check offerings have been effectively excluded from
the registration exemption provided for in Regulation A and Rule 504
under Regulation D. 193
99 Id. § 508; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44; Robb, su-
pra note 44,
too Penny Stock Reform Act § 508; 1-1:R. RCP. No. 101-617, at 34. Several other meas-
ures were taken in the PSRA in order to combat fraud in the penny stock market. Sec
Penny Stock Reform Act §§ 505, 508; H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 39. The PSRA added a new
paragraph to Section 15 of the Exchange Act to establish a system for comprehensive dis-
closure in the penny stock market. Penny Stock Reform Act § 505. It required the SEC to
adopt rules requiring brokers and dealers to provide customers with a specific "risk disclo-
sure" document before effecting any penny stock transactions. Id. The amendment re-
quired that the document contain numerous statements regarding the nature of the risk
involved in the penny stock market, information about the broker or dealer and her duties
to the investor, information about the stock itself, and the means with which to receive
additional information on broker-dealer disciplinary histories. Id.
Subsection 7(a) required the SEC to conduct a comprehensive review of the enforce-
ment and oversight activities of the self-regulatory organizations monitoring the penny
stock market. Id. § 510;1-1.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 33.
lel 17 C.F.R. § 230.419 (2008); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE. LAW OF SECUPEEMS REGULA-
TION § S,4[7], at 132 (5th ed. 2005).
1" 17 C.F.R. § 230.419; HAZEN, supra note 101, § 3.4[71, at 132.
ms 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.419, 230.501; 69 AM.	 2n Securities Regulation—Federal § 233
(2008). Regulation A provides for a conditional small issues exemption from registration
under the Securities Act of 1933. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263. Section 230.51 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, which governs the scope of the exemption, eliminates development
stage companies with no specific business plan or purpose, or whose business plan is to
merge with an unidentified company or companies from the exemption. Id. § 230.251(a)(1).
Rule 504 under Regulation D details an exemption for limited offerings and sales of securi-
ties not exceeding $1,000,000. Id. § 230.504. Subsection (a) (3) specifically disqualifies any
"development stage company that either has no specific business plan or purpose or has
indicated that its business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified
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In addition, Rule 419 requires that proceeds garnered in a blank
check offering be deposited into an escrow account maintained by an
insured depository institution or a separate bank account created by a
broker or dealer acting as a trustee. 104 This includes securities issued
in connection with the offering to underwriters, promoters, or others
as compensation or otherwise.'" Such funds, including interest or
dividends, must be held for the sole benefit of purchasers during the
offering. 106
After the initial sale of the blank check company's securities, Ex-
change Act Rule 15g-8 prohibits any sale of deposited securities or
interests until the securities are released from the Rule 419 ac-
count. 1 °7 A blank check company may only release funds and securi-
ties from the account if several conditions are met.'" First, the blank
check company must enter into a business acquisition in which the
fair market value of the target equals at least 80 percent of the WO
proceeds.'" The company must then file a post-effective amendment
to its registration statement, which must disclose information con-
cerning the acquisition pursuant to Rule 419(e). 110
Within five business days of the effective date of the post-effective
amendment, the registrant must send each purchaser a copy of the
prospectus contained in this post-effective amendment, as well as any
other supplements or amendments.'" Next, the registrant must pro-
company or companies, or other entity or person." Id. Rule 419 does not apply to offerings
by small businesses that are not blank check companies, such as limited partnerships, where a
detailed plan of business is developed, but specific investment properties are unidentified.
Similarly, start-up companies with specific business plans did not fall within the Rule's pur-
view, even if operations have not commenced before the initial offering. Id. § 230.419;
HAZEN, supra note 101, § 3.4[7], at 132.
104 17 C.F.R. § 230.419; 69 Am. Jim. 2n Securities Regulation—Federal§ 233.
1°5 17 C.F.R. § 230.419; 69 Am. Jim. 21) Securities Regulation—Federal§ 233.
100 17 C.F.R. § 230.419(b); 69 Am. init. 2n Securities Regulation—Federal § 233. Persons
may not lawfully sell or offer to sell any security deposited and held in escrow pursuant to
Rule 419, or any interest in or related to such security, unless it is pursuant to a qualified
domestic relations order as defined by the Internal Revenue Code or Title I of the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act and its subsequent rules. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-8.
107 17 C.F.R. § 230.15g-8. Rule 15g-8 further prohibits the sale of any other interests
based on the deposited security, regardless of whether delivery is required. Id.
too See id. § 230.419 (e ) .
100 See id. § 230.419(e) (1); HAZEN, supra note 101, § 3.4[7], at 132. This calculation in-
cludes any funds received or to be received upon exercise or conversion of securities of-
fered, but excluding underwriting conumissions, underwriting expenses and dealer allow-
ances payable to non-affiliates. 17 C.F.R. § 230.419(e) ( I); HAZEN, SUP/71 note 101, § 3.4[7],
at 132.
110 17 C.F.R. § 230.419(e) (1); HAZEN, supra note 101, § 3.4[7], at 132.
111 17 C.F.R.§ 230.419(e)(2)(i).
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vide purchasers at least twenty, but no more than forty-five business
days from the effective date of the post-effective amendment to notify
the registrant of their desire to remain an investor." 2 If such purchaser
notification is not received within the allotted time, the purchaser's de-
posit must be refunded." 3 Filially, the registrant must consummate the
acquisition meeting the criteria set forth above.'"
Once the transaction has been consummated, and the escrow
agent or trustee has received a signed representation from the regis-
trant that the above conditions have been met, the funds may be re-
leased. 15 When purchasers of the offering receive this post-acquisition
information, they must he granted the opportunity to withdraw their
deposit funds. 18 Furthermore, if the acquisition does not occur within
eighteen months of the effective date of the initial registration state-
ment, the offering's proceeds must be returned to its purchasers."?
D. The Latest Round of Public Shell Regulation
On August 22, 2005, the SEC issued new provisions intended to
deter fraud and abuse in securities markets through the use of report-
ing shell companies." 8 These new rules and amendments address the
use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by public shell compa-
nies." 9 In its final rule, the SEC defined a shell company as a regis-
trant with no or nominal operations and no or nominal assets, assets
consisting solely of cash and cash equivalents, or cash and only nomi-
112 Id. § 230.419(e) (2) (ii).
113 1d.
114 Id. § 230.419(e) (2) ( iii).
" 5 Id. § 230.419(e) (3).
118 17 C.F.R. § 230.419; HAZEN, supra note 101, § 14[7], at 132.
" 7 17 C.F.R. § 230.419; HAZEN, supra note 101, § 3.4[7], at 132.
118 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.419; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Compa-
nies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234 (Judy 21, 2005); Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.
"8 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.419; 239.16b; 249.308; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form
20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 12. Form S-8 is used
by public companies to register securities for sale under the Securities Act of 1933 in con-
nection with employee benefit plans. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.16b; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K,
and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 12. Form
8-K is used to disclose certain corporate events on a current basis under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F
by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 12. Form 20-F is a form
under the Exchange Act for foreign private issuers. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f; Use of Form S-
8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9,
at 12.
20091	 Why the SEC Should Promote Special Purpose Acquisition Companies 	 253
nal other assets.'" The rules and amendments prohibit public shell
companies from using Form S-8 until they have become operating
companies and until sixty days have passed from the filing of the in-
formation required for filing of a registration statement."' This par-
ticular rule seeks to address the use of Form S-8 registration state-
ments by reporting shell companies to circumvent the registration
and prospectus delivery requirements of the Exchange Act. 122
On November 7, 2005, Section 5.06 of Form 8-K became effec-
tive.'" Section 5.06 requires a shell company that is reporting an event
that causes it to cease being a shell company to disclose the same type
of information it would be required to provide in registering a class of
securities under the Exchange Act within four business days after the
completion of the transaction. 1 P 4 This forces private companies at-
tempting to go public through a public shell reverse merger or reverse
triangular merger transaction to disclose the same level of information
required by a traditional IPO. 125 The goal was to provide the requisite
information useful to investors in making informed decisions about
investing in a company. 126
IL MODERN-DAY SPACs
Modern-day SPACs present an attractive alternative to the tradi-
tional IP0. 127 This Part begins with a discussion of several protective
measures that SPACs voluntarily include within their bylaws that dimin-
ish some of the risks investors may have faced in previous blank check
1" See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2; Use of Form 3-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Com-
panies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13. The SEC declined to define the
term "nominal," arguing that the term was not inappropriately vague or ambiguous. Use of
Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234. It reasoned
that quantitative thresholds would present a serious potential problem because they could
be more easily circumvented. Id.
121 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.16b; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Compa-
nies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.
122 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.16bUse of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Compa-
nies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.
In See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308; Use of Form 5-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Compa-
nies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.
121 See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Compa-
nies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.
125 See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308; Use of Form 8.8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Compa-
nies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.
126 See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Compa-
nies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.
127 Smith et al., supra note 1; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44.
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offerings. 128 It continues by summarizing the relative merits of gaining
access to the capital markets through a SPAC merger. 129 Finally, this
Part describes the general evolution of SPACs within the market)"
A. Self-imposed SPAC Restrictions
The restrictions of Rule 419 are generally not applicable to
SPACs, which fit beneath an exception provided in Rule 3a51-1 of the
Exchange Act for issuers with less than three years of operations who
have a minimum of $5 million in net assets.'" To the extent that an
issuer promptly files a Current. Report on Form 8-K upon consumma-
tion of an IPO showing that net assets are in excess of $5 million, the
SEC will not deem the issuer a blank check company subject to Rule
419. 132 Accordingly, SPACs typically file such a report upon consum-
mation of the IPO, thereby avoiding the restrictions Rule 419 would
otherwise impose. 133
Despite the limited applicability of Rule 419, SPACs restrict their
own activities in an effort to provide a certain degree of investor pro-
tection. 134 Many of these measures mirror the recently proposed crite-
ria for SPAC listing on the Nasdaq. 135 The current trend is for SPACs
to incorporate these provisions in their organizational documents. 136
Similar to the requirements of Rule 419, the proceeds generated
from a SPAC IPO are deposited in escrow and are not released until
133 See infra notes 131-154 and accompanying text.
' 29 See infra notes 155-180 and accompanying text.
136 See infra notes 181-209 and accompanying text.
131 Boehm et al., supra note 5; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1(g) (1) (2005).
132 Boehm et al., supra note 5; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1(g)(1). For an argument
against extending Rule 419 to SPACs, see generally Daniel S. Riemer, Special Purpose Acqui-
sition Companies: SPAC and SPAN, or Blank Check Redux?, 85 WAstl. U. L. Rcv. 931 (2007).
For an article discussing whether to regulate the market in the context of trading financial
assets, see David E. Van Zandt, The Alarket as a Property Institution: Rules for the Trading of
Financial Assets, 32 B.C. L. REV. 967, 1025 (1991). Van Zandt identifies the important issue
as "not whether some idealized notion of a 'free market' is superior to some idealized no-
tion of 'regulation'"; but whether '`a particular market structure 'economizes' most thor-
oughly given the nature of the assets, the demand for transacting and the available cost-
reducing technology." Id. lie concludes that, when market structures are faced with diffi-
cult commons problems, it may be that government regulation is the best 'economizing"
technology. Id.
in Van Zandt, supra note 132, at 1025.
134 Matthew S. Town & John Niedernhoffer, Attack of the SPACs, SAN DIEGO DAILY
TRANSCRIPT, Sept. 26, 2005, available at fittp://www.sddi.com/reports/article.cfm?RID=
355&SourceCode=20050926rb; see also Boehm et al., supra note 5.
133 See Press Release, Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., supra note 1.
138 Boehm et al., supra note 5.
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either a business combination occurs or the SPAC liquidates."' The
remaining 20 percent is used to enable management to seek out a suit-
able target, to conduct thorough due diligence on any potential target,.
to cover any other miscellaneous operating expenses, and to reimburse
management for out-of-pocket expenses."8 Beyond such reimburse-
ments, the SPAC's initial stockholders receive no compensation for
their services unless and until they have effected a business combina-
tion . "9
If a combination is not effected within the self-imposed deadline,
which usually spans between twelve and eighteen months, the SPAC
liquidates.m Most SPACs, however, provide for an extension of the ini-
tial deadline (up to twenty-four months) if management has reached
an agreement in principle with a prospective target."' Upon liquida-
tion, pro rata shares of the escrowed funds are distributed to the
SPAC's shareholders."2 Initial stockholders are generally excluded
from receiving any distribution of escrowed funds with respect to any
shares they acquired prior to the IPO. 145
In addition to meeting this timing requirement, the company ac-
quired in a SPAC's initial transaction must have a fair market value in
excess of 80 percent of net assets. 144 Further protecting its shareholders,
SPAC transactions require majority approval from investors before any
business combination.145 Even upon obtaining majority approval,
SPACs may be prevented from completing a business combination if
more than 20 percent of disapproving shareholders seek to convert
their shares."6
Some SPACs have included additional safeguards as a result of
market expectations or of agreements between the initial stockholders
and underwriters. 147 SPACs often require initial stockholders to agree
to lock-up provisions to ensure that those stockholders retain their
1s7
	
see also Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
I" Boehm et al., supra note 5.
159
140 Id.; see also Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
"'Town & Niederhoffner, supra note 134; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
152 Town & Niedernhoffer, supra nate 134; Boehm et al., supra note 5. Despite this re.
turn of funds to stockholders, investors generally do not fully recover the cost of their in-
vestment upon liquidation. Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134; Boehm et al., supra
note 5.
"5 Boehm et al., supra note 5.
144 Id.; see also Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
"5 Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
1415 Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
17 Boehm et al., supra note 5.
256	 Boston College Law Review	 (Vol. 50:237
ownership interests in the company until a designated period after a
business combination. 148 This period generally spans anywhere from six
months to three years. 149 This may help discourage directors from mak-
ing a bad investment decision because of an impending liquidation
deadline, especially because the initial stockholders do not receive a
pro rata share of a pre-combination liquidation distribution.'"
In order to further align the interests of the initial stockholders
with investors purchasing in the IPO, a SPAC may also require that the
initial stockholders purchase a fixed dollar amount of warrants in the
public markets. 151 These warrants will be subject to a lock-up period
until the SPAC enters into a business combination. 152 Finally, some
SPACs sell their lead underwriter an option to purchase additional
units at a nominal cost.'" These units typically have comparable terms
as the units issued in the IPO; however, the unit purchase price and the
warrant exercise price are higher. 154
B. An Alternative Route to Going Public
SPACs, as well as other public shells, often present an attractive op-
portunity for private operating companies seeking the advantages of
becoming a public company while avoiding the costs inherent in the
IPO process. 155 This enables private companies to access the capital .
markets through either a reverse merger or reverse triangular merger
with a public she11. 156 SPACs can be particularly attractive to private
companies seeking an alternative to the traditional IPO precisely be-
cause they have not conducted any business and thus should be free of
any contingent liabilities. 157
Aside from the costs of an IPO, these shells may present the only
opportunity for emerging companies to gain access to the capital
markets. 08 Investment banks favor larger private companies with high
revenues and a strong operating history because they are more attrac-
"6 Id.
149 Id.
199 See id.
191 Id.
192 Boehm et al, supra note 5.
153 Id.
194 Id.
I" See Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
196 Smith et al., supra note 1; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44.
197 Town Sc Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
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K. Sjostrotn, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and .Share Liquidity, 50
B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2009); Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88.
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live to investors. 159 In 2004, there were 249 IPOs, only eleven of which
raised less than $25 million. 160
For emerging enterprises, where the process, service, or product
is new and untested, a successful IPO can be difficult even if a com-
pany successfully attracts an investment bank to underwrite its offer-
ing. 161 In addition to "selling" itself to an investment bank, the com-
pany must "sell" itself to the investing public. 162 A private company
can never be certain how the investing public will react to its offer-
ing. 163 This uncertainty, combined with the general instability of the
market, yields the very real threat that the time and money private
companies spend towards preparing an IPO could be completely
wasted if the transaction is not consummated.'"
A reverse merger with a SPAC provides the private operating com-
pany with a large infusion of cash from the proceeds of the SPAC's
IP0. 165 Because a SPAC already has an existing trading market in its
securities, the private company also enjoys immediate share liquidity.' 66
This liquidity, which may increase the value of the shares themselves, is
furthered by the vested interest of the relevant underwriter(s) in sup-
porting the market after a reverse merger. 167 The experience of a
SPAC's management team in ensuring compliance with the Securities
Act,' 68 the Exchange Act169, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sar-
banes-Oxley") 17° may also ease the operating company's transition into
fulfilling the regulatory requirements of a public company."'
In addition to their use for acquiring and going public with indi-
vidual companies, SPACs are now being formed as a way to purchase
asset managers.' 72 This offers managers new routes to public capital,
199 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 90.
162 Id.
469 Smith et al., supra note 1, at 90.
164 Id.
169 Id. at 91.
166 Sjostrom, supra note 15, at 758.
167 Id. An investment becomes more attractive when potential investors know they
would have the ability to quickly sell their shares. Smith et al., supra note 1, 88-91; Maris,
supra note 14, at 41; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
16°15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
160 Id. §§ 78a-7800.
170 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stn. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
171 See, e.g., Oakmont Acquisition Corp., Prospectus (Form S-1/A) ( July 11, 2005).
172 Jay Cooper, Money Managers Target of "Blank-Check" Firms; SPACs Offer Firms New Liky
to Gain Capital Without IPO, PENSIONS & NI/Es-mewls. Jan. 21, 2008, at 2. For example, on
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thereby enabling them to obtain currency to grow without the hassle
and risk of an IPO. 173 It further allows staff to focus on the business
rather than spend a significant period of time on an IPO road show."4
Although there are currently no publicly listed venture capital vehi-
cles on American exchanges, developments on London's Alternative
Investment Market ("AIM") seem to indicate that such a development
remains another plausible use for SPACs. 175
Potential downsides regarding use of SPACs as a vehicle for going
public include the requirement that the SPAC investors vote in favor of
the merger, coupled with the concept that less than 20 percent of
stockholders opposing the merger can exercise their right to convert. 176
This requires considerable time and expense in order to solicit the
stockholder vote and hold the stockholder meeting. 177 Furthermore, a
private company entering into a business combination with a SPAC will
likely have to live with a much larger retained equity stake by stock-
holders of the SPAC. 178 Private companies may, however, be able to take
advantage of the small time period in which individual SPACs must en-
November 7, 2007, Freedom Acquisition Holdings, Inc., took public London-based hedge
fund manager, GLG Partners, Inc., in a $3.4 billion dollar deal. Id. This transaction came
one year after a SPAC created by the founders of Berkshire Capital Securities LLC,
Highbury Financial, acquired the U.S. mutual fund business of ABN AMRO for $38.6 mil-
lion. Id. New York-based Grail Partners is quickly following suit with its filing of a registra-
tion statement with the SEC to form Grail Investment Corp., another SPAC. Id. Although it
cannot identify any prospective targets prior to its offering, Grail is expected to acquire a
firm from the asset management industry. Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 See Arleen Jacobius, A Different Vliay to Fund Venture Cap; LSE Public Fund Listings Cm
ate Permanent Capital, Extend Investment Cycle by Years, PENSiONS Be INVESTMENTS, Dec. 10,
2007, at 2. According to Jacobins, a "wave of pioneers" has developed a method for fund-
ing venture capital firms by listing public funds on the AIM instead of raising money pri-
vately. Id. This provides permanent capital, thus lengthening the typical investment period
for venture capital firms from the typical three to six years to eight years. Id. By lengthen-
ing the investment period, the executives of publicly listed venture capital funds gain time
to hold on to their best-performing portfolio companies longer, so that they may grow to
their full potential. Id. It also allows them to nurture slower-growing, promising compa-
nies. Id. As a result, this new model has the potential of making these funds perpetual
fundraising machines." Id.
176 Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 139; Boehm et aL, supra note 5.
"'Town Niedernhoffer, supra note 139; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
178 Smith et al., supra note 1, at 91. It is important to note, however, that private com-
pany ownership generally retains more control over the general direction of their compa-
nies than if they had obtained venture or private equity funding. Broude, supra note 24, at
76-79. Private company ownership has also pointed to their ability to postpone the re-
quired "sale" of their vision to public stockholders until after the merger, as opposed to
prior to the issuance of shares. Barker & Hedin, supra note 3, at 38.
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ter into a business combination, using the timeline as leverage to bar-
gain for a sweeter deal.'" Private companies must thus balance all of
these potential upsides against the cost of compliance with SEC regula-
tions of public companies, as well as the value of the company's in-
creased vulnerability to changes in economic or market couditions. 113°
C. The Rise of the SPA C
In the wake of the slowdown of the IPO market, there has been a
recent surge in SPAC transactions. 181 As recently as 2005, most SPAC
179 Barker & Hedin, supra note 3, at 38. Conversely. this is one drawback of investing in
a SPAC pre-acquisition. See id.
James, supra note 8, at 98; Smith et al., supra note 1, 88-91; Klaris, supra note 14, at
41; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
nen Boehm et al., supra note 5. Because SPACs are merely a vehicle for pooling capital
in an effort to acquire an unidentified operating company (from any market sector, de-
spite any previously identified focus), investors who purchase shares in the IPO invest pri-
marily in the expertise of a SPAC's management team. Such teams are generally comprised
of private equity, and hedge fund operators, current and former mutual fund managers
and Wall Street analysts, and various current and former politicians and corporate execu-
tives. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 91; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134. Conse-
quently, in many ways, investors' hopes that management will enter into a lucrative merger,
yielding a profit for everyone, is largely "on faith." Karen Richardson & Peter Lattman,
Financiers Now Say "Trust Us" —.Like the Blank-Check Offerings of Yore, SPAC Investors Are Asked
to Buy 1n—on Faith, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2007, at Cl.
Hedge funds, venture capital firms, and other institutional investors have been a sig-
nificant factor in the surge of SPAC IPOs. Smith at al., supra note 1, at 91; Town & Nied-
ernhoffer, supra note 134. In fact, investment by parties not deemed to be institutional
investors is often limited to a specified number of states. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 91;
Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134. SPACs are attractive investment vehicles for these
sophisticated investors because they can capitalize on a SPAC's unique securities structure.
Smith et al., supra note 1, at 91; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134. SPACs are listed
through both shares and warrants, which trade at different prices until an acquisition is
announced. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 91; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134. Hedge
funds often employ arbitrage strategies to profit from these price differences. Steven M.
Davidoff, The Unseen Mergers Boom: SPACs, N.Y. Timm DEALROOK, Jan. 6, 2008, Imp://
dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/the-unseen-mergers-boom-spacs/ . The approval
of SPAC transactions often occurs several months after announcement. Id. Although the
proxy statement to approve the transaction, which includes relevant financial and other
information, is not immediately filed after announcement, investors may trade the SPAC
shares in the interim in anticipation of the acquisition. Id. Such activity avoids the gun-
jumping provisions normally imposed on IPOs, thus creating short-term trading opportu-
nities for hedge funds to take advantage of information deficits. Id.
In addition to the opportunities presented by their securities structure, SPACs provide
an opportunity to participate in a private-equity style investment in a publicly traded secu-
rity. Richardson & Lattman, supra; Kit R. Rome, Business Buffet: When Hiingry Investors
Want to Make a Meal of a Company, They Can Pool Their Millions in Something Called a SPAC,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REr., Jan. 22, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/
biztech/articles/060130/30spacs.hon; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134. Experienced
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underwriters were second and third tier securities firms, but larger
securities firms, including Goldman Sachs Group, Deutsche Bank AG,
and Citigroup, Inc., are beginning to participate. 182 In 2007 alone,
sixty-six SPAC offerings raised over $12 billion, and SPAC offerings
comprised 25 percent of all IPOs and 20 percent of aggregate money
raised. 183
 For the first three quarters of 2008, they amounted to 53
percent of all IPOs within the United States, and 75 percent of aggre-
gate money raised."34
Several SPAC IPOs and business combinations in the past year in-
dicate that this growth in the SPAC market is likely to continue. 185
Apollo Management L.P. raised $300 million for Marathon Acquisition
Corp., another SPAC. 186
 Freedom Acquisition Corp.'s IPO in Decem-
ber, which was underwritten by Citigroup, raised $520 million. 187 SPACs
are also beginning to acquire higher-profile private companies. 188
American Apparel, a nationwide clothing retailer, recently agreed to
combine with Endeavor Acquisition Corp., a SPAC that raised $130 mil-
lion in 2005. 189
 On March 13, 2006, Services Acquisition Corp., a pub-
licly traded SPAC listed on AMEX, announced its planned acquisition
of Jamba Juice for $265 million. 190 In November 2007, the IPO of Lib-
erty Acquisition Holdings Corp. became the first SPAC to break the $1
billion mark when it listed on AMEX. 191
In addition to the recent surge in deal flow and size, AMEX
granted the SPAC structure some level of credibility by beginning to
financial players can thus identify private companies with great potential that could be
tapped through either more effective management, large infusions of cash, or access to
the capital markets. Richardson Be Litman, supra. They present an upside inherent in the
deal if the management team identifies a good undervalued private company to take pub-
lic. See id. They also grant institutional investors the flexibility to continue owning the
shares after the initial business combination, as well as protection if those investors vote
against a business combination and exercise their right to convert. Smith et al., supra note
1, at 91; Richardson & Littman, supra ; Roane, supra ; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note
134.
182 Cowan, supra note 3; Eric J. Savitz, The New Blind Pool, BARRON'S, Dec. 21, 2005, at 22;
Town & Niedernhoffer, SUP! note 134; Nicholas Pettifer, 2008: Year of the Spacs?, IFLRLEGAL-
WIRE, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.iflr.com/Article/1983123/2008-year-of-the-Spacs.html.
183 Davidoff, supra note 181.
nu Id.
185 See Richardson & Lattnian, supra note 181; Roane; supra note 181.
186 Richardson & Littman, supra note 181.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
'9° Id.
191 Blank-Check Liberty Acquisition IPO Tops $1 Bln, REUTERS, Dec. 12, 2007, http://mvw.
reuters.com/article/newIssuesNews/idUSN1261457920071212.
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list SPACS in 2005. 192 As of early 2007, it listed twenty-three SPACs.' 93
In perhaps the most striking sign of the growing acceptance of SPACs
in the market, Nasdaq and the NYSE announced that they would pro-
pose a rule change to the SEC for the listing of SPACs in February
and March 2008, respectively.'" According to Bob McGooey, senior
vice president of Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., his exchange believes
that "listing [SPACs] on NASDAQ, subject to ... important investor
protections, [would] benefit investors and issuers alike."'"
Beyond having to satisfy all applicable initial listing standards, the
Nasdaq proposal would require SPACs to meet several more stringent
listing standards. 196 First, gross proceeds from the IPO of a SPAC of-
fering must be deposited in an escrow account maintained by an in-
surance depository institution as defined by the Federal Deposit In-
surance Act or in a separate bank account established by a registered
broker or dealer. 197 Second, the company must complete one or more
business combinations using an aggregate cash consideration equal to
at least 80 percent of the value of the escrow account at the time of
the IPO within 36 months of the effectiveness of its IPO registration
statement.'" Finally, while a SPAC is in the acquisition stage, each
business combination must be approved both by the company's share-
holders and by a majority of the company's independent directors.' 99
Following each business combination, the combined company must
meet all of the requirements for initial listing. 200
The response to Nasdaq's proposal thus far, as with any other
SPAC-related matter, has been mixed."' The thirty-six month dead-
line that Nasdaq would impose has already been pointed to as dou-
bling the time period specified in Rule 419. 202 Others have hinted that
Nasdaq has only retreated from its objection to listing SPACs because
192 Richardson & Lattnnan, supra note 181.
192 Id.
194 Cowan, supra note 2; Press Release, Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., supra note 1.
192 Cowan, supra note 2; Press Release, Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., supra note 1.
I" Press Release, Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., supra note 1.
197 1d.
198 Id.
199 Id.
299 Id.
291 See Davidoff, supra note 181; Posting of Zac Bissonnette to Slogging Stocks,
http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2008/02/24/nasdaq-lightens-up-on-blank-check-ipos/  (Feb.
24, 2008, 10:10 EST); Posting of Douglas A. McIntyre to hunoney, http://www.inmoneroday.
com/2008/02/22/nasdaq-ndaq-wants-to •list-blank.check-companies/ (Feb. 22, 2008, 17:20
EST).
202 Davidoff, supra note 181.
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the amount of money generated from SPAC offerings has become too
prominent to ignore. 203 Another commentator has argued that trad-
ing in SPACs on stock markets before they engage in a business com-
bination with an actual operating company is mistaken because trad-
ing in a SPAC is trading in a "phantom." 2"
On March 6, 2008, NYSE followed Nasdaq's lead with its proposal
to the SEC to create an exception that would allow SPACs to list. 205
Generally, NYSE's IPO rules require companies to have a financial
history spanning up to three years. 206 That rule has prevented SPACs,
which do not have any operating history or money on their balance
sheets prior to going public, from listing.207 The SEC could use these
announcements to attempt to implement its own regulation of SPACs,
potentially triggering a longer public review of SPACs. 208 Although the
SEC is expected to approve any rules Nasdaq and NYSE propose be-
cause Amex already permits these listings, such an approval would not
likely represent a departure from the SEC's policy of subjecting SPAC
filings to greater scrutiny. 209
III. THE CASE FOR MODERN-DAY SPACs
Regulation of blank check companies represented the reaction of
Congress and the SEC to widespread fraud and manipulation permeat-
ing the penny stock market. 21° As one of the most prominent vehicles
for enacting such penny stock schemes, blank check companies received
especially close scrutiny during this wave of lawmaking.2 I Although this
reaction was based on several legitimate concerns regarding public shell
companies, many of the underlying issues that motivated this wary treat-
ment of public shells no longer exist. 212 This Part argues that the chang-
ing nature of SPACs warrants an attitude adjustment from the SEC dur-
ing its reviews of SPAC offerings and transactions. 213 Instead of viewing
203 Posting of Zac Bissonnette, supra note 201.
"4 Posting of Douglas McIntyre, supra note 201.
206 Cowan, supra note 2.
208 Id.
"7 Id.
2" Posting of Douglas McIntyre, supra note 201.
"9 See M.
210 Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101 -429, § 502,104 Stat. 931, 951;
H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-13 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1408,1411-15.
211 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-13,22-23.
212 See id. at 22-23; Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181;
Smitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
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them merely as potential vehicles for fraud and manipulation, the SEC
should recognize their potential as an alternative vehicle enabling pri-
vate companies to access the capital markets. 2"
A. Natural Market Forces Have Been More Successful Than the PSRA and
Subsequent SEC Rules
One consistent, fundamental notion of free-market governance is
that expanding the powers of government over the affairs of business
remains a dangerous proposition. 215 Although the PSRA and the restric-
tions of Rule 419 were intended to keep fraudulent issuers out of the
IPO market, at least one empirical study has indicated that some issuers
have circumvented the PSRA by simply offering securities at a higher
price.216 That is, promoters and broker-dealers have adjusted their
schemes by offering securities that do not meet the technical definition
of "penny stocks."217 As opposed to improving issuer quality, the period
following the passage of the PSRA thus provides evidence that specula-
tive issuers could have migrated to the "non-penny" range. 218 These un-
intended effects of the PSRA emphasize the difficulty of crafting legisla-
tion geared toward reducing undesirable behavior in a securities
market.219 Because the method of limiting such activity can be easily cir-
cumvented (for example, by simply offering securities at a higher price),
the PSRA has proven to be largely ineffective. 220
Other commentators have argued that the problems of the PSRA
extend beyond merely providing easy loopholes for fraudulent bro-
kers and dealers to exploit. 2" Although it provides investors in penny
stock enhanced disclosure, the PSRA imposes substantial costs on is-
suers, brokers, dealers, and investors of penny stock. 222 Liability im-
posed through the Act would tend to deter honest penny stock bro-
214 See jenny Anderson, Crave Huge Risk? This Investment May Be for You, N.Y. 'DIMES,
Sept. 23, 2005, at 7; cf. Sjostrom, supra note 158.
213 See ADAM SMF111, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES. OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Modern Library 2000) (1776); see also Monte E. Wetzler, A Remedy Worse Than the
Problem, N Y TIMES, July 23, 1989, at F2 (arguing against the expansion of SEC power in
the wake of insider-trading scandals).
216 Beatty & Kadiyala, supra note 8, at 518.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 532.
219 Id. at 538.
r0 Id.
221 Carolyn E. Lampe, The Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990: A Costly Solution to a Serious
Problem, 13 GEO. MASON L. FUN/. 779, 801 (1991).
222 Id
264	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 50:237
kers and dealers from the market, without encouraging fraudulent
brokers from doing the same. 223 The costs of increased disclosure may
also prevent some small businesses from entering the market if fewer
brokers are able to trade their stock. 224
Similar to the requirements of the PSRA, the SEC's Rule 419 re-
garding blank-check offerings has been easily circumvented. 225 The
restrictions of Rule 419 are generally not applicable to SPACs, which
rely on an exception provided in Rule 3a51-1 of the Exchange Act for
issuers with less than three years of operations who have a minimum
of $5 million in net assets. 226 To the extent an issuer files a Current
Report on Form 8-K promptly upon consummation of an IPO show-
ing that net assets are in excess of $5 million, the SEC will not deem
the issuer a blank check company subject to Rule 419. 227 Accordingly,
SPACs avoid the dictates of Rule 419 merely by filing a Current Re-
port upon consummation of the IP0. 228
In spite of the apparent failures of the PSRA and subsequent SEC
rttlemaking, SPAC issuer quality has continued to improve due to natu-
ral market forces. 229 As more SPACs begin flooding the market, SPACs
have become forced to differentiate themselves from other SPACs, as
well as other investment vehicles such as hedge funds and private equity
funds.230 Because they have recognized the potential of SPACs, promi-
nent underwriters such as Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and Citi-
group are getting involved and taking financial stakes in SPAC deals. 231
This combination of issuer quality with the increased level of competi-
tion for both investors as well as private operating companies has thus
provided tangible results, whereas governmental intrusion at best has
produced no results, and at worst has yielded unanticipated collateral
damage.232
223 Id.
224 Id.
223 Boehm et al., supra note 5; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-I (g) (1) (2005).
226 Boehm et al., supra note 5; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1 (g) (1),
227 Boehm et al., supra note 5; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1 (g) (1).
2211 Boehm et al., supra note 5; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3x51-1(g) (1).
220 See supra notes 181-209 and accompanying text.
23° See supra notes 181-209 and accompanying text.
231 Cowan, supra note 3; Matthew Goldstein, Company Man Draws Blank, THESTREET.COM ,
July 27, 2006, http://wwwthestreet.com/story/10299584/1/company-man-draws-blank. hind.
232 See Wetzler, supra note 215 (arguing against the expansion of SEC power in the
wake of insider-trading scandals).
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B. A Far Cry. from the '80s
The fact that previous legislation and SEC rulemaking have failed
to achieve their desired results does not alone call for a less antagonis-
tic SEC review of SPAC offerings. 233 A simple qualitative comparison
between current SPACs and the blank checks of yore, however, dem-
onstrates that the legitimate concerns motivating the PSRA and sub-
sequent rulemaking have in large part been addressed through the
natural evolution of the SPAC form. 234 The parties involved, the level
of information available to investors, and the amount of disclosure
required have all reduced the level of manipulation, fraud, and ex-
ploitation of the market. 235
1. A Changing Cast of Characters Has Reduced the Level of Manipu-
lation, Fraud, and Exploitation in the Market
During the 1980s, the penny stock market was dominated by nu-
merous brokerages dealing strictly in penny stocks throughout the
country.236 These penny stock brokerages hired sales staff with almost
no industry knowledge or experience, and they targeted small, unso-
phisticated investors with false information and intense pressure to
immediately buy or sel1. 237 Because they were dealing in penny stocks,
penny stock brokers were able to control the flow of information about
the companies that they sold investors as well as the price investors paid
for those companies. 238 In addition to the proliferation of speculative
underwriters in the penny stock market, many of the key players within
penny stock brokerages, as well as blank check companies, were former
violators of federal and state securities laws, former convicted felons,
and persons with strong ties to organized crime. 239
In contrast to the blank check companies of the 1980s, modern-
day SPACs involve a very different set of players. 2" People responsible
233 See infra notes 236-323 and accompanying text.
234 See infra notes 236-323 and accompanying text.
235 See infra notes 236-323 and accompanying text.
236 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 9-12.
237 Id.; see Henriques, supra note 44; Nash, supra note 48; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra
note 44; Leonard Sloane, Many Dangers of Blind Offers, N.Y. Timm, May 9,1987, at 38.
2" H.R. Rte. No. 101-617, at 9-12.
2s°
	 supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note
44.
20 See H.R. REP. No 101-617, at 9-12; Doyle. supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44;
Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44; Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra
note 181; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
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for the formation of SPACs have typically been professionals involved in
the private equity and hedge fund industry. 241 Recent prominent foun-
ders of SPACs have included three former Apple executives, a former
adviser to Presidents Clinton and Bush, a former congressman, an
owner of two professional sports teams, and a former hedge fund man-
ager. 242 These individuals have already displayed their financial acumen
through other investment vehicles, such that they have earned suffi-
cient market credibility to attract. investors who invest chiefly in their
ability to choose and ultimately manage the "right" private operating
company.243
Moreover, unlike blank check investors, who were selected pri-
marily due to their vulnerability to boiler room tactics, hedge funds
and various institutional investors are now the most common investors
in SPACs. 244 These highly sophisticated parties have both the market
power and financial savvy to evaluate the unique risks of investing in
such companies. 245 Similarly, the speculative underwriters that used to
dominate the blank check industry appear to have lost their hold on
the SPAC market. 246 Upon initial emergence in the twenty-first cen-
tury, SPAC transactions primarily attracted second and third-tier un-
derwriters. 247 In recent years, however, some of the world's most pres-
tigious underwriters, such as Goldman Sachs, Citibank, and Deutsche
Bank have entered the SPAC market.248
Finally, the target companies with which recent SPACs have
merged have very little in common with the private companies identi-
241 See Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra
note 44; Richardson & Lattman. supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note
182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
242 Avery, supra note 1, at 82-87; Hester, supra note 19.
245 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note
182, at 22; Town & Niedern holler, supra note 134.
244 See Avery, supra note 1, at 82-87; Goldstein, supra note 231.
245 See Avery, supra note I, at 82-87. Like any other investment vehicle, there are sev-
eral risks attendant to investing in a SPAC. See, e.g., Endeavor Acquisition Corp.. Registra-
don Statement (Form S-1), at 9-19 (Sept. 20, 2005). Such factors include, but are not lim-
ited to, an investor's inability to evaluate management's ability to achieve its business
objective; the potential for forced liquidation; the fact that many of the SPAC's officers and
directors may have conflicts of' interest in connection with business opportunities; and the
reality that, because its initial business combination must utilize at least 80 percent of its
assets, the success of' the investment is likely to be solely dependent on a single business
and a limited number of products or services. See id.
246 See Avery, supra note 1, at 82-87.
247 See Cowan, supra note 3; Goldstein, supra note 231.
246 Cowan, supra note 3; Goldstein, supra note 231.
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fled in the blank check schemes of the 1980s. 249 Then, penny stock
brokers were able to control the flow of information regarding the typi-
cal target company. 25° Because of this monopoly of information, inves-
tors had little to no hope of verifying the purported "incredible upside"
of these "emerging companies."251 The modern SPAC market, however,
has featured increasingly prominent private companies going public via
SPAC transactions. 252 SPAC managers cannot wield the same level of
control when merging with nationally recognized brands such as
American Apparel and Jamba Juice. 253 Rather than being victimized by
this monopoly on information, the public easily tracks the details of
these private companies and their SPAC transactions, which are now
closely followed in numerous news mediums throughout the country 254
2. The Modern Character of the SPAC Market 1-las Yielded Greater
Competition and Greater Quality
This new cast of characters has yielded a changing market char-
acterized by inner competition. 255 The architects of blank check
schemes in the 1980s targeted individual investors with little experi-
ence and little to no chance of effectively evaluating the risks in-
volved. 256 Finding potential customers was thus as easy as opening a
phone book and dialing. 257 Furthermore, because the private compa-
nies targeted by blank check managers were often the product of
their imagination, finding a suitable emerging company with "limitless
potential" was no more difficult than identifying prospective investors. 258
245 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note
182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
250 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-13.
25/ Id. at 9-12.
See Ken MacFadyen, SPAC Invaders: While Blackstone Stole the Headlines, Hedge Fund
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Conversely, the SPAC market has become increasingly competitive
as this investment vehicle continues gaining market credibility. 259 In-
stead of picking up a phone book and instituting pressure campaigns
rife with misinformation in order to manipulate inexperienced inves-
tors, today's SPACs must attract extremely sophisticated institutional
investors and hedge funds in order to generate sufficient proceeds in
the initial offering. 26° Accordingly, SPACs are forced to take measures
to make themselves an attractive investment. 261 After evaluating the
SPAC during the initial offering period, stockholders are given a sec-
ond chance to evaluate their investment once management has identi-
fied a target company. 262 When investors find prospective targets unat-
tractive, for whatever reason, they have the automatic right to convert
their shares to cash. 263
Within this competitive market, SPACs have also had to differen-
tiate themselves from other investment vehicIes. 2" A SPAC is often a
more attractive investment opportunity than other public shell com-
panies because it has been formed precisely for the purpose of taking
a private company public. 265 As such, it has no operating history, and
likely no contingent liabilities. 266 In addition to competing with other
investment vehicles, the recent proliferation of SPACs has led to in-
creased competition among SPACs themselves. 267
Furthermore, the competition does not end after the IP0.268 In
addition to competing for investors at this initial stage, so as to garner
sufficient capital to engage in a business combination, SPACs must also
compete for target companies. 269 In order to remain viable, a SPAC has
to present an attractive alternative to going public through the tradi-
259 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note
182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
260 See Avery, supra note 1, at 82-87.
261 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note
182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
262 See Anderson, supra note 214.
263 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note
182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
264 SeeHolman, supra note 255, at 22-26; Saigol, supra note 255.
265 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note
182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
266 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note
182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
267 See Davidoff, supra note 181.
206 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note
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tional IPO process.") Once a private company has made the decision
to go public through either a reverse merger or reverse triangular
merger with a public shell, a SPAC must differentiate itself from other
public shells and from other SPACs. 271
This increased competition with other investment vehicles, other
public shells, and other SPACs at both the initial offering and business
combination stage has led to greater investor protection in SPAC trans-
actions. 272 As part of this effort, SPACs have voluntarily self-imposed
many of the Rule 419 restrictions that technically do not apply. 278 In
recent deals, SPACs have even put away as much as 95 percent of funds
garnered in the initial offering into an escrow account. 274 hi some in-
stances, the underwriter has put a portion of its fees into the same ac-
count until an acquisition has been made. 275 Unlike a private equity
investment, SPAC shareholders thus have the ability to help determine
whether a particular business combination takes place, and they have
immediate share liquidity. 276
Although Nasdaq's current proposal would extend the typical life-
span of a SPAC from eighteen to twenty-four months to a period of
thirty-six months prior to liquidation, it promises greater investor pro-
tection as wel1. 277 In addition to the regulatory scrutiny of the SEC and
perhaps Congress, as SPACs begin listing on more prominent ex-
changes, they would have to meet the listing standards of the respective
exchanges.278 Also, providing a SPAC with a longer period in which it
may seek out and come to terms with a suitable target may be better for
its investors.279 It may take longer for them to see the returns on their
investment, but it could also reduce the bargaining leverage of targets
using the deadline to strike a rather favorable dea1. 288 If investors lose
patience, they can always take advantage of the liquidity attendant to
any public company and sell their shares. 281
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3. Sufficient Safeguards Exist for Investors
Section 5.06 of Form 8-K, which became effective November 7,
2005, requires a shell company reporting an event that causes it to
cease being a shell company to disclose the same type of information it
would be required to provide in registering a class of securities under
the Exchange Act. 282 Effectively, this means that private companies that
are going public through a SPAC merger must disclose the same level
of information required by an IPO. 283 Accordingly, investors are pre-
sented with the same level of information as in any other offering when
making the decision whether to purchase or sell shares in the new pub-
lic operating company. 284 Investors thus have sufficient information to
evaluate the relative risks and rewards in making such a decision. 285
A recent trend is that hedge fund managers are forming SPACs
instead of hedge funds. 288 Assuming a limited pool of investment man-
agers who would form any of these kinds of vehicles, this may result in
enhanced disclosure within the alternative investment industry as inves-
tors in such investments are migrated to investment vehicles with dis-
closure requirements.287 Generally, hedge funds have been viewed as
secretive in nature, in large part because of certain provisions in the
Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act of 1940,
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which have exempted the ma-
jority of hedge funds and their advisers from registering with the
SEC.288 SPACs, however, must immediately comply with the Securities
Act, the Exchange Act and Sarbanes-Oxley. 289
Although an investment in a SPAC, like any other investment, car-
ries with it a potentially high degree of risk, the safeguards built into the
bylaws of these corporations provide investors with considerably more
protection than other investment vehicles. 29° First, SPACs keep at least
80 percent of IPO proceeds in an escrow account, thereby protecting
232 See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2008); Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell
Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234 (July 21, 2005); Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.
233 See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Com-
panies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hog-an, supra note 9, at 13.
284 See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Com-
panies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.
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against inappropriate uses of the publicly raised funds. 291 Second, unlike
investors in private equity funds or hedge funds, investors in SPACs have
immediate liquidity. 292 This enables them to sell their shares at a mo-
ment's notice, whereas private equity and hedge fund investments are
normally subjected to minimum commitment periods as long as ten
years. 293 Third, investors in a SPAC have a say over whether a business
combination takes place. 294 Unlike other investment. vehicles, the board
of directors of a SPAC must disclose a significant amount of information
in its proxy materials, making its business decisions considerably more
transparent. 295 If shareholders harbor any doubt over a proposal, they
can vote against a transaction or convert their shares to cash. 296 Filially,
if, at the end of the day, the SPAC goes south, shareholders at least get a
pro rata share upon liquidation. 297 This pro rata share generally does
not equal the initial investment; however, unlike other investment vehi-
cles, it helps to cap potential for loss. 298
C. SPACs Facilitate Capital Formation
In addition to the large increase in quality, modern-day SPACs
could positively impact the economy. 299 The cost of going public
through an IPO has become more and more expensive, contributing to
an overall slowdown in the IPO market. 30° In addition to the costs of
regulatory compliance, private companies evaluating the risks of an
IPO often determine that these potential hazards outweigh the possible
benefits of becoming a public company. 301 For some emerging compa-
nies, going through the IPO-process is not even an option because they
are incapable of finding an underwriter willing to conduct the offer-
ing.302 Although the SEC must play some sort of formal and informal
gatekeeping role with regard to becoming a public company, sound
291 Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
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policy would promote alternative methods by which emerging compa-
nies may access the capital markets."3
As the subprime mortgage crisis brings talk of an imminent reces-
sion, the SEC should be acting to facilitate capital formation instead of
singularly fixating on the protection of investors.304 Some commenta-
tors have pointed to the incredibly high amount of leverage in the
market as the basis for the current credit crunch. 505 Massive levels of
debt underlying the world economy system are unwinding, leading
some analysts to predict an impending bear market of "epic propor-
tions."390 As a result, leveraged buyouts ("LBOs") have "all but disap-
peared," as borrowing costs nearly doubled from June 2007 to Decem-
ber 2007."7 LBOs in the United States fell from $322.4 billion in the
first six months of 2007 to $103.2 billion in the second half of the year
as the subprime mortgage market collapsed." 8
SPACs present an opportunity for private companies to infuse
themselves with large amounts of cash in equity as opposed to debt." 9
Enabling private companies to access these infusions of cash outside
of private investment could help them expand rapidly."° Such entities
have the ability to continue growing both internally and through ac-
303 See Hester, supra note 19.
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quisitions because they will be lightly leveraged compared to LBOs. 3 "
If these cash infusions had come from bank borrowing rather than
from equity, the companies involved would have substantial annual
interest expenses.'" This ability to thrive in such a credit-poor envi-
ronment has helped SPACs become one of Wall Street's only positive
performers in an otherwise dismal year. 313
The immediate growth that SPACs facilitate in certain private
companies may also sustain gains in employment. 314 Several studies
suggest that fast-growing companies account for a very large portion
of employment growth." 5 As much as 50 percent of employment
growth may come from fast-growing new companies like Google." 8 In
addition to creating job growth, enabling more companies to access
the capital markets helps support the market itself." 7 In 2007, Wall
Street earned $770 million from the sale of shares in sixty-four SPACs,
and SPAC offerings accounted for 25 percent of all IPOs and 20 per-
cent of the aggregate money raised. 918 This helped counter the overall
reduction of earnings for IPOs. 319 The importance of maintaining po-
tential revenue-generators for Wall Street during IPO-slowdowns has
recently been illustrated rather dramatically by the "fire sale" of Bear
311 Id. The outlook for LBOs in the private equity industry is even more dismal for
2008, in large part because of the credit crunch, which has 'siphoned off the fuel that
makes the private equity machine run? Andrew R. Sorkin, Live From Germany: Super Return
2008, N.Y. TIMES DEALROOK, Feb. 26, 2008, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/
26/live-from-germany-super-return-2008/index.html?hp. The industry seems to expect an
increase in equity deals with minority stakes, and few, if any, LBOs. Id.
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Stearns, the demise of Lehman Brothers, the sale of Merrill Lynch &
Co., and the government bailout of the U.S. financial system.'"
Finally, because SPACs generally do not rely on significant amounts
of leverage to finance transactions, their potential economic benefits are
not offset by any considerable dangers imploding SPACs could cause to
the global financial market."' The SEC has recently emphasized the
havoc that the collapse of highly leveraged hedge funds could reek on
the financial community in its latest attempts to modify regulation of
that industry.'22 As such, the recent decisions of hedge funds to utilize
SPACs to accumulate capital, as opposed to continuing to use significant
levels of debt, should come as a relief."'
CONCLUSION
The PSRA and subsequent SEC regulations regarding blank-check
companies came in response to a national crisis within the penny stock
market. At the time, stringent regulation of such entities was appropri-
ate to curb systemic manipulative and fraudulent practices. Modern-day
SPACs, however, do not display the alarming characteristics that made
the blank-check companies of the 1980s so devastating to the credibility
of the U.S. markets. Rather, the recent upsurge in SPAC transactions
displays a trend towards increased quality within the SPAC market.
On their own, SPAC transactions have replaced second- and third-
tier underwriters with reputable international powerhouses like Gold-
man Sachs, Citigroup, and Deutsche Bank. Such increased issuer qual-
ity was a primary goal of blank-check company regulation; however,
where the market has achieved such a result, Congressional and SEC
regulations have failed. Moreover, inexperienced private investors have
been replaced with highly sophisticated institutional investors and
hedge funds, and largely obscure targets are beginning to be replaced
by rather prominent private companies.
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The slowdown in both the IPO market and the economy at large
suggests that alternative routes for emerging companies to access the
capital markets should be promoted. Consequently, when considering
regulatory issues involving public shell companies, the SEC should re-
consider its apparent distaste of SPACs. Even in the wake of the penny
stock fraud of the 1980s, the authors of the PSRA were careful to avoid
delegitimizing the blank check structure itself, instead emphasizing the
necessity of providing individual investors with sufficient information to
thoroughly evaluate their investment decisions. Continuing to curb the
pace of SPAC offerings thus reflects a misguided attempt to protect in-
vestors at the expense of allowing this latest Wall Street innovation to
facilitate capital formation.
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